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The economics literature has often stressed the "public", nonrival, nature of information goods and the di¢culties they are associated with for the achievement of an optimal allocation of resources (Arrow (1965) ). Data …les and software goods, for instance, can be centralized and accessed with a computer and a telephone line when needed for producing a service. Alternatively, they can be replicated and installed on personal computers. 1 In either case, the consumption of one individual does not reduce the quantity of the good available for the other individuals. Information goods thus belong to a vast class of public (nonrival) goods, with no obligation of use and the possibility of exclusion. An additional characteristic, which we want to emphasize in this paper, is that access to the good may be costly. In other words, some private good or service must be consumed along with the public good. For information goods this cost may take di¤erent forms: connection or telecommunications expenditure, the cost of the personal computer, individual learning costs, etc. Examples of information goods with costly access abound. Cable TV often o¤ers subscription fees supplemented by pay-perview access charges. In most countries, access to internet requires a local telecommunications charge. Furthermore, it always involves the capital cost of the required equipment. Micropayments for access to websites already exist for some type of services and one can expect their generalization as technology progresses. Beyond these information goods, many other public goods have costly access. Most natural sites, like national parks or beaches, require transportation costs which may make them unaccessible to some consumers.
Goods with these characteristics have been studied by Agnar Sandmo, who considers general technologies available to consumers (Sandmo (1973)) or producers (Sandmo (1972) ) for transforming private goods and public goods into new private goods. 2 In this paper we consider a special case of such technologies, 3 but introduce asymmetric information as an additional and crucial feature. Speci…cally, we assume that the cost of this technology is private information of the consumers.
The costly access of these public goods raises new redistributive issues. It is not su¢cient to make these public goods available when some consumers cannot a¤ord the cost of access. The information technology revolution, combined with the low access costs to internet, have spurred great hopes that LDCs would be able to bene…t from all the informational public goods available in the developed world. However, the concern that this information technology revolution might exacerbate rather than mitigate the di¤erences between LDCs and developed countries has been expressed recently (UN report (1999) ). 4 One reason for this disenchantment is the recognition that the private costs of accessing those public goods have often been neglected or, at least, underestimated. In addition to the pricing of these public goods (like the pricing of scienti…c journals accessible by internet), one must pay attention to the cost of computers, the cost of telecommunications and, last but not least, the usage cost which is highly dependent on the education level.
The importance of the public goods with costly access made available by the information technology suggests that a thorough and speci…c economic analysis of the allocation, consumption and production of these goods is useful. This paper provides a …rst step in this direction by studying the optimal allocation of these goods, once the production process is available.
This question is considered in a world of asymmetric information, where the resources of some consumers may be insu¢cient to a¤ord the private cost 2 The property that access involves a private, real cost for the consumer distinguishes our setting from the literature on club goods where the access cost is typically a price.
3 However, because of …xed costs, our technology does not satisfy Sandmo's concavity assumptions. 4 This concern has led to the strange proposition of taxing e-mail to favor communicating at the world level (UN report (1999) ). associated with the public good consumption (that is when the so-called …nancial constraints are relevant). Along the way, we examine whether the optimal policy involves a (positive or negative) tax on access and/or usage.
Furthermore, we study the allocation that emerges if the good is provided by a pro…t maximizing monopoly. 5 Section 2 presents the model and characterizes the optimal allocation of resources under complete information. When …nancial constraints are irrelevant, we obtain a generalized version of Samuelson (1954) 's conditions and identify two main regimes. In one of the regimes, the no-exclusion regime, all individuals consume the full quantity of available public good.
In the other regime, the exclusion regime, some individuals consume less than the available quantity of public good because of the access cost.
Next, we address the case when access may be limited by …nancial constraints. Then, the allocation of resources depends on the correlation between the access costs and the …nancial resources. In the case of positive correlation (the rich are also the ones with low access costs), the connection of the poor may require subsidies which imply a "limited liability" rent. Because of the social cost of this rent the consumption of the poor is reduced.
In the case of negative correlation (the poor are the ones with low access costs), the limited liability rent is given to the low cost individual and results in a reduction in the provision of the good. Section 3 characterizes the distortions implied by asymmetric information on access costs in the absence of …nancial constraints limiting access.
It is shown that asymmetric information expands the domain of parameters for which some individuals do not consume all the available public good because of the information rent which must be given up to consumers with low access costs. Furthermore, it is shown that usage is taxed (except possibly 5 See Drèze (1980) for the regulation of a monopolistic provider of public goods with exclusion. Monopoly provision of an excludable public good has also been studied by Cornes and Sandler (1996, Ch. 8) who do allow for asymmetries of information but have neither private connection costs nor …nancial constraints.
for the low cost type) while access is subsidized.
Section 4 combines asymmetric information and …nancial constraints and studies the interaction between these two phenomena. In the case of positive correlation the limited liability rent of the poor must now, by incentive compatibility, also be conceded to the rich. Consequently, asymmetric information increases the cost of subsidizing the poor. The distortions in the Samuelson conditions now have two origins.
In the case of negative correlation (the poor are the ones with low access costs), the analysis di¤ers from a classical adverse selection problem in two ways. First, the limited liability rent associated with the …nancial constraints may induce countervailing incentives. 6 Second, some deviations may not be …nancially viable; for example an individual with high access cost may not be able to claim he has a low access cost because he cannot a¤ord the bundle allocated to the low cost consumers. This expands the set of implementable allocations.
Finally Section 5 considers two extensions. First, we study a setting where the good is provided by a pro…t maximizing monopoly. We characterize the monopoly solution and compare it with the optimum in order to analyze the distortions that result from a monopolistic provision of the public good. Second, we show how income e¤ects modify the analysis.
2 The model and the complete information benchmark
The model
Consider a public good with the following characteristics. There is no obligation of use and exclusion of use is possible. The cost of G units of this public good is given by cG, i.e., the marginal cost is constant. There is a continuum [0; 1] of consumers. Each one must incur a …xed cost k and a 6 On countervailing incentives, see Lewis and Sappington (1989) , Maggi and RodriguezClare (1995), Jullien (2000) , Jeon and La¤ont (1999). variable cost µg to access the public good, that is to consume a level g > 0.
Individual consumption is less than or equal to the provided level G.
Consumers di¤er in two respects: marginal cost of access, µ 2 fµ 1 ; µ 2 g and income, y 2 fy 1 ; y 2 g. For simplicity, we consider a population with two types of individuals only. Type 1, (µ 1 ; y 1 ) representing a proportion º of consumers and type 2, (µ 2 ; y 2 ), representing a proportion 1 ¡ º. Throughout the paper it is assumed that µ 1 < µ 2 , so that type 1 always refers to the individuals with the lowest cost of access.
Let t i be the payment made by an agent of type i to enjoy the public good. The agent's utility level is given by
if he accesses the public good (so that g i > 0), and U i = y i , if he does not access the public good. Since there is no obligation of use, the following participation constraint will always have to be satis…ed:
Furthermore, let 1 +¸be the social cost of public funds.
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Finally, when we introduce …nancial constraints, we assume that the consumption of the numeraire good is restricted to be non-negative so that
must be satis…ed. With quasi-linear preferences these …nancial constraints are a stylized way to incorporate income e¤ects and, to a limited extent, redistributive considerations. 8
7 See La¤ont and Tirole (1993) for a discussion of the social cost of public funds. 8 A major bene…t of our approach is that it enables us to provide a full characterization of the results, both with positive and with negative correlation between access costs and incomes; see also Section 4. In the Appendix we show brie ‡y how the results of Sections 2 and 4 can be obtained with a budget constraint (endogenous cost of funds) along with a concave social welfare functions.
Optimal allocation without …nancial constraints
We now turn to the determination of the optimal (utilitarian) allocation under full information. Throughout the paper we shall concentrate on situations where it is socially optimal to connect both types of individuals to the public good. This is because we are interested in understanding how informational and …nancial constraints a¤ect the cost of providing a public good which is so valuable that it should be accessed by all. In this situation, both types consume a positive level of the good and incur the …xed cost of connection. The optimal utilitarian allocation can then be obtained by solving the following problem:
s:t:
Recall that the participation constraints, (P i ), must be satis…ed because there is no obligation of use. The solution to this problem is presented in the following proposition, where ¢µ = µ 2 ¡ µ 1 .
Proposition 1 Under complete information, when the …nancial constraints are not relevant, the optimal (utilitarian) allocation is characterized by
Equations (3) and (5) are the modi…ed Samuelson conditions. In regime ii) we can return to the familiar formula by thinking in terms of net valua-
The social value of the sum of the marginal rates of substitution (or marginal net valuations) equals the (social) marginal cost.
In regime i) there is a corner solution for consumer 2 whose net valuation is negative at g 2 = G ¤ . The Samuelson condition applies to the consumers of type 1 for whom the resource constraint on the public good is binding.
Since there is no obligation of use, the consumption level of 2 maximizes his net valuation and satis…es u 0 (g and then decreasing. The "satiation point" for type 1 is to the right of that for type two. 9 The consumption bundle of each type lies on the indi¤erence curve corresponding to his reservation utility level. The optimal level of
where the slope (willingness to pay) is c=º > 0. Type 2 consumes g ¤ 2 corresponding to point A, the maximum of his indi¤erence curve. Observe that the total marginal willingness to pay, at consumed quantities, equals º(c=º) + (1 ¡ º)0 = c.
Consequently, an extended version of the Samuelson condition continues to hold.
Regime i) occurs as long as A is to the left of B. When the two indifference curves are su¢ciently close (¢µ is small) and/or when c=º is large, the no exclusion regime ii) occurs with both types consuming G ¤ . This allocation (point (A n ; B n ) in Figure 2 ) is determined so that the sum of the slopes of the indi¤erence curves (for a given level of G) equals c.
The decentralization of the optimal allocation characterized in Proposition 1 requires two types of instruments. To induce the right public good consumption levels, personalized (Lindahl) prices are needed to account for the di¤erent net valuations of consumers. In regime i) these prices are: 10
In regime ii) they are given by:
In both cases, type 1 who has a higher net valuation pays a higher price and the sum of these prices equals the marginal cost of production. Since the cost function is linear, the revenues levied under this pricing scheme cover cost.
Because of the social cost of public funds, the social planner wants to set consumers at their reservation utility level. Consequently, the personalized prices must be complemented by personalized lump sum taxes K ¤ i . 11
10 Under complete information, the observability of individual consumption is not necessary. To determine the optimal level of public good supply it is su¢cient to know the distribution of types. Then, one can decentralize the levels of consumption by rationing type 1 individuals in case i) and both types in case ii).
11 Graphically the Ki's correspond simply to the intercept of the tangent; see Figure 1 .
Full information optimum (A; B) and optimum under asymmetric information (A 0 ; B 0 ). Both solutions are for regime i) and the …nancial constraints are ignored.
Full information optimum (A n ; B n ) and optimum under asymmetric information (A 0 n ; B 0 n ) under regime ii); the …nancial constraints are ignored. Solutions under regime i).
Optimal allocation with …nancial constraints
We now add the …nancial constraints (F i ) in Problem 1. To understand the interplay between …nancial and participation constraints, it is useful to combine (P i ) and (F i ) which yields
When u(g i ) ¡ y i < 0 the right-hand-side of (7) is equal to zero and (P i ) is binding, while (F i ) is automatically satis…ed. The opposite result, with (F i )
binding, obtains when u(g i ) ¡ y i > 0; this is the situation to which we now turn. We distinguish between two cases.
"Positive correlation"
We use this term to refer to the situation where type 1 is the "good" type for both characteristics, access cost and income; i.e., when y 1 > y 2 . When only type 2 is …nancially constrained, t 2 is determined by (F 2 ) (rather than by (P 2 )) while t 1 continues to be determined by P 1 . Maximizing welfare,
given by (2) subject to (P 1 ) and (F 2 ) yields:
Since one unit of income for type 2 has social value of 1 +¸, the marginal social cost of consumption is (1 +¸)µ 2 . This justi…es a downward distortion determined by (9); see (4) for the reference case without distortion.
To have type 2 bene…t from the public good, the utilitarian social planner has to concede a rent, which we will refer to as limited liability rent. To see this note that when (F 2 ) is binding we have
so that the utility of type 2 is above its reservations level.
In the no-exclusion regime, this costly rent a¤ect the level of production.
We have:
The limited liability rent, u(G) ¡ y 2 , which must be given to type 2 has an expected marginal cost of¸(1¡º)u 0 (G) which justi…es a downward distortion of the supply of public good.
Observe that in both cases the availability of the public good decreases
"Negative correlation"
Now assume that y 2 > y 1 : type 2 is the "bad" type for the cost but the good type for the income. This describes, for instance, a situation where smart poor consumers have a lower access cost. In the case where only the poor is …nancially constrained, the problem now consists in maximizing welfare, given by (2), subject to (F 1 ) and (P 2 ) which, depending on the relevant regime, yields:
Regime ii):
Now type 1 must be given a limited liability rent, u(G) ¡ y 2 , and since he is the one determining the level of public good, there is a downward distortion of production in both regimes. Once again, inequality decreases.
Depending on the "severity" of the …nancial constraint, two di¤erent types of situations can be distinguished. First, when the constraint is not too severe (the income of the constrained individual is not too low), the …nancially constrained agent can a¤ord to pay for his expenses (y i > µ i g i + k), but the entire surplus is not captured. Second, for a more severely constrained individual, access cost, or even marginal connection cost may have to be subsidized (y i < µ i g i + k). For brevity, we will not explicitly distinguish the two cases in the subsequent discussion; we shall always say that access is subsidized. 12
Asymmetric information
Consider now the case where there is incomplete information: (µ i ; y i ) is private information of type i. However, in this section we assume that the …nancial constraints, (F i ), are always satis…ed. The optimal allocation is determined by maximizing expected social welfare under participation and incentive constraints: 13
Problem 2
12 In the negative correlation case with binding …nancial constraint, a third regime with G = g2 > g1 cannot be ruled out when the types' access costs are su¢ciently close (i.e., when ¢µ <¸µ 1 ). To avoid further proliferation of cases, we ignore this regime. Its potential occurrence does not a¤ect our results.
13 From the Revelation Principle we know that there is no loss of generality in restricting the analysis to pairs of contracts, (t 1 ; g 1 ; t 2 ; g 2 ), based on the observable variables.
Because of our quasi-linearity assumption, participation and incentive constraints are independent of the income levels. The problem is therefore equivalent to a classical adverse selection problem for a single parameter of adverse selection µ and utility functions given by the net valuations, u(g i ) ¡ µ i g i , with the resource constraint g i · G, i = 1; 2. Consequently, the participation constraint of the bad (high cost) type (µ 2 ) and the incentive constraint of the good type will be binding.
Using (P 2 ) and (IC 1 ), the payments of the two types can then be expressed as follows:
An information rent, ¢µg 2 , must now be conceded to type 1, the good type.
The solution to Problem 2 is presented in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Under incomplete information, when the …nancial constraints are not relevant, the optimal (utilitarian) allocation is characterized by:
(
The right-hand side of (16) The determination of the solution for the no-exclusion regime ii) is illustrated in Figure 2 . We obtain a solution like (A 0 n ; B 0 n ) with g 1 = g 2 = G < G ¤ and with the sum of marginal valuations larger than in the full information case.
The distortions in quantities imply that marginal prices may require upward incentive corrections, i.e. marginal taxes on usage. In regime i) they are given by
with a correction solely for type 2; recall the no distortion at the top property which applies for the low cost type. In case ii), on the other hand, we have
and both prices are larger than their full information counterparts; see (6).
As for the lump sum taxes, it can easily be seen (e.g., from Figures 1 and 2) 14 , 14 Or from a straightforward algebraic argument that they are in each case smaller than their full information counterparts.
This correction can be "interpreted" as a subsidy for access.
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With the concept of generalized marginal cost introduced above, one can continue to interpret marginal prices in regime ii) as Lindahl prices. This is because we have the following property:
However, this interpretation does not go through in case i).
Asymmetric information thus has the following consequences. First, it expands the region where only type 1 consumes the entire quantity of public good. In that case, the no distortion at the top result implies that the quantity of public good is the same as under complete information. However, to decrease the information rent of type 1, the quantity consumed by type 2 is decreased. Second, in the regime where both types consume all the available quantity, the provided level of public good G is decreased to mitigate the cost of the information rent. To sum up, because of asymmetric information, usage is taxed except for type 1 in case i), while access is subsidized in all cases.
To conclude, let us turn to the issue of inequality. Under complete information the availability of the public good had no impact on inequality;
both types remained at their initial utility levels U i = y i , i = 1; 2. Under asymmetric information, however, the low-cost individuals receive a rent and this fosters inequality when they also have the higher income (case referred to as positive correlation). In other words, while the availability of the public good results in a Pareto improvement, it bene…ts the rich more than the poor. However, when the low-cost type individuals have the lower income, then the availability of the public good decreases inequality.
We are now in a position to address the more di¢cult case when …nancial constraints are binding under asymmetric information. The formal problem is a¤ected in two ways. First, we explicitly take into account the …nan-cial constraints, (F i ), which require that the consumers be able to have a nonnegative consumption of the private good.
Second, we have to consider the fact that some deviations from truthtelling might not be …nancially possible. For example, a poor consumer might not be able to claim that he is rich because he cannot a¤ord the bundle designed for the rich. Consequently, there is the possibility that some incentive constraints can be neglected because they are associated with impossible messages. 16 The optimal allocation thus has to satisfy the following constraints:
Problem 3: constraints
16 The idea here is that the agent will not send out of equilibrium messages which would result in bankruptcy. Observe that the space of messages of type µi; M(µi), is now a function of µi. This raises an additional potential problem, namely that the revelation principle might not be valid. However, in the case with only two types, the condition for the validity of the revelation principle (Green and La¤ont (1983) ) always holds. Consequently, we will not have to worry about this question here.
The objective function and the set of decision variables are the same as in Problems 1 and 2. The solution will depend on the type of correlation which exists between the private costs of access and the levels of income.
We consider successively the two cases; for the sake of brevity we shall henceforth concentrate on regime i).
Case 1: "Positive" correlation
Now, y 1 > y 2 and further we assume that y 1 is su¢ciently large so that (F 1 ) can be neglected. We can then expect that the incentive constraint of the good (low cost, high income) type will matter. His deviation to µ 2 is …nancially viable because (F 2 ) implies
The constraints which will matter are then the incentive constraint of the good type, (IC 1 ), and either the participation constraint, (P 2 ), or the …-nancial constraint, (F 2 ), of the bad type. These last two constraints can be rewritten as:
Consequently, the following two basic cases can arise: 17
When the solution satis…es u(g 2 ) < y 2 the …nancial constraints are not binding. For type 2, the relevant constraint is the participation constraint, (P 2 ) and we return to Problem 2 considered in the previous section. The solution continues to be given by Proposition 2.
Now the solution is a¤ected by the …nancial constraints. For type 2, the relevant constraint is (F 2 ) (rather than the participation constraint (P 2 )) which implies
From (IC 1 ) we have
In regime i) the solution is as follows.
As in Section 2.3, the …nancial constraint implies a limited liability rent, u(g 2 ) ¡ y 2 , for type 2. To maintain incentive compatibility this rent must be added to the rent ¢µg 2 which was already conceded to type 1 in the previous case. All of these rents depend only on g 2 . Consequently, as long as there is exclusion, only the allocation of g 2 is distorted downward to decrease the rents. The consumption of type 1 and the provided level of public good are the same as in case 1.2. The distortion of g 2 is greater than in case 1.2, because of the limited liability rent, u(g 2 ) ¡ y 2 , which must be given up to everybody.
The determination of the solution is illustrated by Figure 3 . It di¤ers from Figure 1 in that the …nancial constraint of type 2, t 2¸y2 ¡ µ 2 ¡ k is explicitly accounted for. When y 2 is su¢ciently large, the asymmetric information solution A 0 ; B 0 prevails and we are in case 1.1. However, for smaller levels of y 2 , A 0 would violate the constraint. Instead, type 2 could be o¤ered point C with the same level of g 2 but a lower t 2 . This yields a costly (limited liability) rent for type 2 which also has to be conceded to type 1. A reduction in g 2 mitigates these rents and we obtain a solution Let us now return to the impact that the availability of the good has on inequality. In the previous section we have shown that in the case of positive correlation inequality increases when the good becomes available under incomplete information. Here the increased inequality due to asymmetric information is una¤ected by the …nancial constraint of the poor.
The main results for the case of positive correlation are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Assume that the low-cost type has the higher income. Under asymmetric information, the …nancial constraint of the poor has the following implications:
(i) When it becomes relevant, it implies further downward distortions which are due to the interaction between …nancial and incentive constraints.
Asymmetric information increases the cost of subsidizing the poor for accessing or consuming the public good.
(ii) While this downward distortion implies a marginal tax on usage, access will be "subsidized" to meet the …nancial constraint of the poor.
(iii) The increased inequality due to asymmetric information is unaffected by the …nancial constraint of the poor.
Case 2: "Negative" correlation
The poor consumers are now the ones with a low cost of access, i.e, they are the good type. The …nancial constraint of the poor (type 1 now) implies that a limited liability rent u(g 1 ) ¡ y 1 must be given up to type 1.
Further, since type 1 is the good type, an information rent ¢µg 2 must also be given up to type 1 because of the incentive constraint (IC 1 ). This is true as long as this incentive constraint is relevant in the sense that the considered deviation is …nancially viable for type 1. We shall make this assumption in a …rst step and reexamine this issue below. Then, the constraints relative to type 1 can be summarized as:
Like in the case of positive correlation we assume that the rich (now type 2)
are su¢ciently rich so that we can neglect their …nancial constraint. Concerning type 2 we will then have to worry about both the participation constraint and the incentive constraint. Three main subcases arise: 18
Case 2.1:
When the income of type 1 is high enough, the …nancial constraint, (F 1 ),
does not matter; it is automatically satis…ed when the incentive constraint of the good type is satis…ed. Consequently, we obtain the same solution as in Section 3. Graphically, this case occurs when the asymmetric information bundle B 0 is below the …nancial constraint of type 1; see Figure 4 .
Case 2.2: u(g 1 ) ¡ y 1 > ¢µg 2 with (F 1 ) and (P 2 ) binding
As y 1 becomes smaller, the incentive constraint of type 1 becomes slack.
Instead, the …nancial constraint of type 1 becomes relevant along with the participation constraint of type 2 which continues to be binding as in case 2.1. For regime i), we obtain the same solution as under complete information when …nancial constraints are accounted for; see expression (11) and (12) 
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Public good supply and the consumption of type 1, G = g 1 is now decreased to reduce the limited liability rent of 1. For type 2 on the other hand, we return to 18 As above, the solution must be continuous. Continuity will be ensured between Cases 2.1 and 2.2 by a regime where (IC1), (P2) and (F1) are binding, and between Cases 2.2 and 2.3 by a regime where (F1), (P2) and (IC2) are binding;see Figure 5 19 But it is still su¢ciently high for the …nancial constraint not to intersect type 2's reservation utility indi¤erence curve. a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a   a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a   a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a 
Figure 4: Case of negative correlation, regime i): impact of the …nancial constraint of type 1 (poor, low-cost) individuals. (A 0 ; B 0 ) is the (standard) optimum under asymmetric information, which prevails when (F 1 ) is not binding. For income levelỹ 1 the solution is (Ã;B), with (F 1 ) and (P 2 ) binding. For even lower incomeŷ 1 , we have countervailing incentives with (IC 2 ) and (F 1 ); a possible solution is represented by (Â;B) .
the full information solution (maximum of the indi¤erence curve). This is because g 2 has no impact on the limited liability rent of type 1 so that there is no longer any reason to distort it.
Note that in both cases 2.1 and 2.2, inequality decreases, either for informational or for …nancial reasons, because a rent is now conceded to the poor (¢µG or u(G) ¡ y 1 ).
Case 2.3 u(g 1 ) ¡ y 1 > ¢µg 2 with (F 1 ) and (IC 2 ) binding
As y 1 is even smaller, the incentive constraint of type 2 becomes binding; countervailing incentives appear. Because the …nancial constraint is binding, an increase in g 1 must be accompanied by a decrease in t 1 , to subsidize the individual for the higher connection cost. But then the consumption bundle of type 1 becomes increasingly attractive to type 2. For u(g 1 ) large enough, the rich-high access cost types then want to claim they are poorlow cost types. Consequently, the binding constraints are then the …nancial constraint of type 1 and the incentive constraint of type 2. A rent must be given up to both types; payments and rents, denoted by R 1 and R 2 can then be expressed as follows:
Combining (23) and (24) we obtain U 2 ¡ U 1 = y 2 ¡y 1 ¡ ¢µG. Consequently, inequality continues to decrease when the public good becomes available.
Expressions (23)- (24) show that the rent of individual 1 is increasing in G. This is because of the subsidization of usage mentioned above. More interestingly, the level of G has an ambiguous impact on the rent conceded to individual 2; we have
The …rst term on the RHS of (25) is positive: with the binding incentive constraint, the limited liability rent conceded to 1 must also be conceded to 2. The second term, on the other hand, is negative. Recall that type 2 is the high-cost type so that an increase in G makes the consumption bundle of 1 less attractive to him.
We obtain the following characterization for case i), with
Since both rents are independent of g 2 , only G = g 1 is distorted. The sign of the distortion is now ambiguous. When u 0 (G) ¡ ¢µ > 0, G is necessarily lower than in the standard asymmetric information case; see Proposition 2.
On the other hand, when u 0 (G)¡¢µ < 0 a positive distortion cannot be ruled out and arises if the impact on the rents of 2, given by (25), is su¢ciently strong, in which case, usage would be subsidized as well as access. 20 These results are also re ‡ected in the marginal price given by
and p 2 = 0.
The solution in Case 2.3 is illustrated by (Â;B) on Figure 4 . Now, the income level of type 1,ŷ 1 , is so low that a solution likeÃ;B is below the indi¤erence curve U 2 = y 2 ; consequently it violates IC 2 . We then obtain the case of countervailing incentives with the added complication, compared to 20 More precisely, the sign of the distortion depends on the impact on the expected rent, which (up to a constant) is given by the cases encountered in the literature, that type 1 also has a rent (namely the limited liability rent). As explained above,B can then be to the right or to the left of B 0 depending on the net impact of G on the rent of type 2. The three basic cases described above are connected by regimes where three constraints are binding to ensure continuity of the solution. For example, when regime i) prevails in all cases we obtain the alternation of cases and the relationship between G = g 1 and y 1 which is depicted on Figure   5 . Observe that the three main cases correspond to those represented on Figure 4 . Recall that the ranking ofB andB is not unambiguous; the case where G is lower atB than atB can also arise.
So far, we have ignored the …nancial constraint of the mimicking individual both in (IC 1 ) and in (IC 2 ). Let us now examine how, if at all, these constraints do a¤ect the results. For this, we have to consider the …nancial viability of the deviations envisioned in the incentive constraints.
In Case 2.2, they clearly do not matter because neither of the incentive constraints binds. In Case 2.1, we have to check if the claim of the poor type 1 to be of type 2 is …nancially viable. Using (P 2), one easily shows that this is the case if
a condition which necessarily holds in Case 2.1 which, by de…nition satis…es
Finally, in Case 2.3, one can show from (F 1 ) that the deviation of the rich is viable only if
In words, the income di¤erential between type 2 and type 1 must be su¢-ciently large to compensate for the di¤erential in variable costs; recall that type 2 is the high cost type.
If (29) holds nothing is changed. If (29) is violated, (IC 2 ) is suppressed.
Then, since we were in the Case 2.3, the relevant constraints become the …nancial constraint of type 1 and the participation constraint of type 2. Consequently, we return to Case 2.2 and the countervailing incentives disappear.
Observe that the conditions de…ning the various cases under negative correlation are independent of y 2 . A situation where (29) is violated can thus de…nitively occur.
The main results of this section are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Assume that the low-cost type has the lower income. Under asymmetric information, the …nancial constraint of the poor has the following implication:
(i) As long as countervailing incentives do not occur, subsidizing the poor for using the public good is not more costly under incomplete than under complete information.
(ii) When countervailing incentives occur, it becomes more costly because the limited liability rent of the poor also has to be conceded to the rich; in that case, the distortions are of ambiguous signs.
(iii) In all cases, inequality decreases as the public good becomes available.
Extensions

Monopoly provision
Let us now consider the case where the public good is provided by a pro…t-maximizing monopoly. This …rm has the same information and faces the same constraints as the social welfare maximizer considered above.
Formally the objective function of the monopoly is given by
while the constraints are the same as in Problem 3: the participation constraints (P i ), the …nancial constraints (F i ), the incentive constraints (IC i ) and the feasibility constraints g i · G for i = 1; 2.
The analysis of this case is very similar to that of the social optimum.
However, there are two main di¤erences. First, the monopoly is even more eager to extract rents from consumers and thus leads to greater distortions.
As a matter of fact, the monopoly case can be viewed as the limit of the social optimum as¸grows (so that¸=(1 +¸) goes to one).
To understand the second di¤erence, recall that limited liability rents were arising when the social welfare maximizer was subsidizing access of poor consumers. In particular, countervailing incentives were occurring when poor consumers with low access costs were favored. The social gain was the (relatively) large rent they obtained from a large consumption of the public good induced by the low access costs. The monopoly, on the other hand, cannot capture this rent. Consequently, it is not interested in favoring the low access cost consumers and the high access cost consumers never want to mimic the low access cost ones. Consequently, the monopoly will exclude the poor much "earlier" than a social planner would do. Summarizing, we have:
Proposition 5 Assume that the public good is provided by a pro…t maximizing monopoly under asymmetric information.
(i) When the …nancial constraints are not binding, the distortions that occur under social welfare maximization are exacerbated.
(ii) The public good consumption of any type is never higher than the minimum level for which the …nancial constraint is binding. Consequently, there is no limited liability rent and the case of countervailing incentives does not occur.
Income e¤ects
So far we have concentrated on the case of quasi-linear preferences. Consequently, income e¤ects have entered the analysis only in a very stylized way, namely through the …nancial constraints. We shall now brie ‡y reconsider the SWM's problem under a more general preference structure to illustrate the added di¢culties of this general formulation.
Let us now suppose that an agent's utility level is given by
For simplicity, we assume that u(g; 0) is su¢ciently small so that …nancial constraints are never binding. Furthermore, we shall concentrate on the case where there is no bunching.
The slope of the indi¤erence curves in the (g; t) plane for type i = 1; 2 is now given by
where u g and u x denote partial derivatives. Assuming normality of both goods it then follows immediately that when y 1¸y2 we have
In words, when the low cost individuals have the higher income, their indifference curves in the (g; t) space are necessarily steeper, at any given point, than those of the high cost individuals. Observe that this inequality remains true when income levels are equal. But it may be reversed in the case where y 2 > y 1 It will become clear below that (32) is crucial for determining the sign of the distortions. 21 . In what follows, we restrict our attention to the case where 32 holds.
The maximization problem of a utilitarian SWM can now be stated as follows.
The complete information solution can be derived from this problem by neglecting the incentive constraints. The results closely resemble those obtained in the quasi-linear case. In particular, one obtains modi…ed Samuelson conditions which are straightforward extensions of (3) and (4) Under asymmetric information, depending on the parameters and on the degree of concavity of u a number of cases can arise. When at least one of the participation constraints binds, the solutions closely resemble those presented in the earlier sections. However, we can now also have regimes of a di¤erent nature which arise when a single constraint, namely one of the incentive constraints, is binding. It is even possible that none of the constraints is binding in which case the complete information solution is revealing and can be achieved under asymmetric information.
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Let us now brie ‡y consider the results for the cases where a single incentive constraint binds.
Case 1: (IC 1 ) is binding
Using the …rst order conditions of the SWM's problem, and denoting an individual's marginal utility of income by:
the optimal allocation, in the no bunching case with G = g 1 > g 2 is characterized by:
where´1 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with (IC 1 ), while a tilde is used for variables pertaining to the mimicking individuals.
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Condition (33) says that the public good consumption of the low cost type (and thus the provided level) is determined by the full information trade-o¤. This is the well-known "no distortion at the top property". 24 To interpret (34), observe that it can be written as
where
while S is de…ned by (31). Using the …rst order conditions one can show that 0 < A < 1:
Further observe that S 2 andS 1 are evaluated at the same bundle (g 2 ; t 2 ).
Using (36) and (32), it then follows that (35) implies S 2 > 0: the consumption level of type 2 is distorted downward.
Case 2: (IC 2 ) is binding
Using the …rst-order conditions and (31), the two relevant conditions characterizing the optimal allocation can be written as follows:
S 2 = 0 (37)
Condition (37) is the familiar "no distortion at the top", except that the identity of the "top" individual has changed compared to the previous case.
Now it is type 2 towards which no incentive constraint is binding.
Turning to (38), using (32) and (39) one can show that this condition implies S 1 ¡ c º < 0; so that there is an upward distortion in the public good consumption of the low cost type, and hence also in the supply G.
Summing up, even when none of the participation constraint binds, the results obtained in the quasi-linear case can easily be extended. There are two main di¤erences, though. First, due to income e¤ects the comparison of public good levels between the di¤erent cases may be ambiguous, and depend on whether the good is normal or inferior. Second the determination of the conditions under which either of these regimes arises is analytically impossible in general case. Recall that in the quasi-linear case, we were able to obtain a complete and explicit characterization of the di¤erent regimes.
We have obtained the characterization of the optimal allocation of public goods with access costs when these access costs and incomes are private information and when …nancial constraints may prevent some consumers to access these public goods. We have restricted the analysis to two types.
The generalization of our results to several types raises two types of technical di¢culties encountered in incentive theory.
First, we would have to deal with multidimensional adverse selection problems, about access costs and incomes, and we know from the work of Amstrong (1996) and Rochet and Choné (1998) that it is di¢cult to identify the binding constraints. Furthermore, we might have to use stochastic mechanisms to elicit incomes as in Rochet (1984) .
Second, it looks as if the necessary and su¢cient conditions for truthful implementability derived in Green and La¤ont (1983) when message spaces depend on private information will not hold in general. This dependence in itself makes the analysis of the relevant incentive constraints even more di¢cult than in the usual multidimensional analysis, and one might have to consider allocation rules not implementable in truthful equilibria.
Beyond these technical problems, the interesting questions lie in the study of imperfect competition in the supply of these goods and in the analysis of innovation. We hope to address these questions in the near future.
and also (A6) (A7).
(A11) can be rewritten
which is again similar to (16) with ¹=¸instead of º¸=(1 +¸). It can also be rewritten u 0 (G) = ºµ 1 + (1 ¡ º)µ 2 + c + º(1 ¡ º) V 0 (2) ¡ V 0 (1)
still an implicit expression.
Income e¤ects perturb the generalized Samuelson conditions as …nancial constraints do in our approach; see Section 5.2 for more general income e¤ects. The bene…t of our approach is to yield explicit optimal solutions.
